Biases and epistemic injustice in taxonomy: the case of arvense and semiwild plants flattened in domestication literature

Abstract

Taxonomies about the natural world reflect or reinforce ways of thinking about the world structure. Almost a century ago, Nikolai Vavilov emphasized the importance of domestication gradients as a taxonomy to encompass agrobiodiversity within centers of origin of agriculture, such as the Mesoamerican one. To date, domestication gradients in Latin America prevail with different cultivated plant species that exist as semiwild or semidomesticated forms, subject to diverse management systems by peasant (campesino) communities. Agroecology and Ethnobotany have highlighted the socio-cultural relevance of arvense plants (plants associated to tillage). This category encompasses useful plants for peasant economies and indigenous cultures as well as weeds whose control involves other types of peasant management practices. Evolutionary biology recognizes the key role played by domestication and management gradients in crop plant evolution. Nevertheless, the term weed (“maleza” in Spanish) is widespread in the scientific literature published in English and it refers to all plants that have not been intentionally cultivated. In the present work we review the scientific literature and reflect on the concepts that underlie terms such as “semi-wild”, “weed” or “tolerated plant”. We propose that a conceptual flattening and concealment occurs when, through language, scientific literature in English reduces the current domestication stages and the plants under diverse management systems to mere “weeds”. We also explore how this categorization could be a case of epistemic injustice within agriculture, one that is aligned with agro-industrial production models. In this context, we posit the question, does the use of the term “weed” in scientific literature and the agro-industrial model of speech, as a broad category that homogenizes nuances of management and valuation, contribute to oppressing perspectives and perpetuates epistemic injustices.